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Motivation This	 paper describes	 the 	evolution	of a community-developed,	 standardizedspecification	 language	 for	 representing and exchanging information in the broadestpossible	range	of 	cyber-investigation domains, including digital forensic science, incident 	response,	and	counter	terrorism. This	initiative	was	 originally	called	 the DigitalForensic Analysis eXpression (DFAX),	which	has	evolved	 into the Cyber-investigation	Analysis Standard Expression (CASE).	 These standardization	 efforts includedevelopment of the 	Unified 	Cyber 	Ontology (UCO) to 	provide 	the 	scaffolding	necessary	to satisfy the requirements of a wide range of use cases in multiple specializations.	 A primary motivation for this community driven initiative is interoperability	 - to 	enable the 	exchange 	of 	cyber-investigation information between tools, organizations, andcountries.	 The CASE specification language and UCO ontology are a rational progressionfrom	 the foundational work on Digital Forensic Analysis eXpression (DFAX), whichfocused on digital forensic information and provenance context (Casey, Back, Barnum,2015). “When investigating a single	 incident, being able	 to combine	 the	 results from multiple	 tools 
that are	 used to extract information from the	 digital evidence	 supports forensic 
reconstruction, including timeline	 creation and link analysis. In addition, being able	 to 
automate	 the	 comparison of similar results from multiple	 tools facilitates dual-tool 
verification. When crime	 spans borders, sharing of information between investigative	 
agencies is crucial for a successful resolution. A fundamental requirement in digital 
forensics is to maintain information about evidence	 provenance	 as it is exchanged and 
processed, to help establish authenticity	 and trustworthiness. Furthermore, without a 
standardized approach to representing and sharing digital forensic information, 
investigators in different jurisdictions may	 never know that they	 are	 investigating crimes 
committed by	 the	 same	 criminal.”	(Casey,	Back, Barnum, 2015) The	power	of	such	a 	standard	is	 that	it	supports automated normalization, combinationand correlation of information, which means less time extracting and combining data,	and more time analyzing information. In	addition,	 the 	exchange 	of 	information in a standardized format helps breakdown data silos,	increasing	visibility	across	 disparate	data sources as depicted in	Figure	1. 
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Figure 1:	 Standardizing	 helps	 break down	 data silos and 	increase 	visibility	acrossmultiple data sources, enabling more comprehensive correlation and analysis. Another primary motivation for CASE is to enable more advanced and comprehensivecorrelation	and	analysis.	 In	addition	 to	 fusing together 	disparate	 sources of information,CASE expresses information in a fully structured	 form that supports a multitude ofanalysis methods.	 In	addition	to	searching	for 	specific	keywords or 	characteristics within	a single case	or	across	 multiple cases,	 having	a structured	 representation	 ofcyber-investigation information allows pattern searching, graph query, data mining, andother	sophisticated	analytics.	 Improved capabilities to find important items can helpsolve a case, and more effective approaches to finding	non-obvious similarities between
3cases can help overcome linkage blindness. 
Linkage	 blindness is an investigative	 failure	 to recognize	 a pattern which « links »	 
one	 crime	 with another crime	 in a series of offenses… (Vernon	J.	Geberth,	Practical Homicide	Investigation) Overcoming linkage blindness can find	 connections	 between cases	involving	the	samecriminal activity in	different 	countries, or	the	same crime pattern hitting different regions. The	 capabilities, flexibility,	and	overall	scope of CASE goes	beyond	all prior 	efforts to	 represent digital forensic information: 
• The XML Data Encoding Specification for Intelligence Document and MediaExploitation (DOMEX) was developed by the U.S. government to share certaintypes of information, including mobile device details (ODNI, 2016). Althoughsome elements in the DOMEX standard are used to keep track of provenance, the 
3 Linkage blindness: A term coined by a criminologist Steve Egger in the context of serial homicides to
describe the failure to recognize that crimes were committed by the same offender because they
occurred in different jurisdictions.
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
 	 	 	 		 	 	 	
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 		 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 					 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 			
		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 				 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 				 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
lack of supporting ontology and the inability to capture relationships limit theexpressivity	and	flexibility	of	this	standard. 
• CybOX has	 been	 rebranded	 as STIX Cyber Observables,	and	concentrates	on	representing cyber	threat 	intelligence (CTI OASIS). 
• Digital Forensics XML or DFXML is a schema that is used by several tools torepresent file system	 information (Garfinkel,	2009,	 2012) and cross-verify	extracted metadata (Nelson, 2014). The initial draft of CASE has been released for broader community use and development(https://github.com/casework)	along	with	the	supporting	UCO(https://github.com/ucoproject). This	 paper 	provides 	a	brief 	history	of CASE and UCO, followed by an overview 	of	 the ontology	and	specification	language.				 
BackgroundThe foundation	 for this community driven standard was called DFAX,	 which 	included initial 	work 	on	the	UCO and 	concentrated 	on	 representing and	 sharing digital forensicinformation.	 DFAX utilized Cyber Observable eXpression (CybOX) to 	represent	thepurely technical information, such as binary artifacts and sources of matched searchpatterns 	(Casey,	Back,	Barnum,	2015). CybOX was 	developed 	for cyber	threat 	intelligence purposes,	and had limitations interms of representing digital forensic and cyber-investigation information. In	2016,	CybOX was replaced	 by	 STIX	 Cyber	 Observables as an integrated component of	the	STIXstandard,	 which	 focuses	 on	 cyber	 threat intelligence. The	 focus of	 STIX	 Cyber	Observables which are embedded within the STIX schema makes it unsuitable as a foundation	 for	 representing	 various	 cyber-investigation	use	cases. Leveraging all	of 	the 	lessons learned from	 CybOX and DFAX, this standardization effortevolved into CASE and UCO	 to 	provide an improved data model and underlyingontology.	 CASE, as a specific profile of UCO, provides support for cyber-investigations	in	any	context,	including criminal, corporate and intelligence. CASE and relevant portions of UCO build on the Hansken data model developed andimplemented by the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI). Building	on	success 	of 	its precursor XIRAF, Hansken provides a robust platform	 that supports hundreds ofinvestigations each year. The Hansken data model provides a solid foundation fordeveloping CASE, including most common traces that are encountered in cyber-investigations,	and	flexible	enough	to	add	new 	types	of	traces.	 Fully structuring data, which is supported by CASE and UCO, enables a wide range ofanalysis and 	correlation	techniques.	Other 	ontology-based efforts aimed at analyzingdigital evidence	 have	 been	 narrowly	 focused,	 and can use CASE as their specificationlanguage. For	 instance, the	 Ontology	for 	the 	Representation	of 	Digital	Incidents and Investigations (ORD2i) referenced DFAX and UCO, and provided a proof-of-conceptimplementation for timeline reconstruction and analysis (Chabot et 	al,	2015).	 The	DESO ontology-based 	approach was 	proposed to 	represent	known	digital	traces and to support triage searches of a digital crime scene for matching characteristics (Brady, et al 
	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 		
		 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 			
	
	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 				
	 		 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 		 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
	 	
	 	
	 	
2015).	 The	 ParFor	 project also	 proposed	 an	 ontology-based approach to 	representing	activities on computer systems (Turnbull, 2015). These efforts demonstrate that	theneed	for 	a	standardized	way	to	represent	and	share	cyber-investigation	information iswell	recognized.	Before UCO, there was limited agreement across the diverse communityfor such ontology. CASE and UCO address this gap with an ontology that can be 	used as a	 basis for community consensus and interoperability across tools and organizations. The CASE specification language is	not 	intended	 to	 define	 how tools or systems arrangedata internally, but rather as a common language that applications can export andimport to support interoperability and normalization.	 Developers of systems andapplications 	can	translate CASE to their internal implementations.	 The	proposed	JSON	serialization is only one form	 of serialization, and the common format could	be	represented	 in XML, Turtle	 (RDF), protocol buffers, or	 other	 serializations. 
UCO	overview The types of information to 	represent	can	be 	treated as 	layers,	with 	the 	lowest	layerrepresenting raw information, the middle layer representing provenance, and the higherlayer 	representing	behavior. 
Figure A:	 Layers	 of	 representing cyber-investigation information 
Observable /Knowledge 
Provenance /Traceability 
Human Behavior (MO/TTP) Action Lifecycle Forensic Actions Provenance Records Traces Locations Tools Identities 
UCO	provides	 an	 ontology	 that	 generalizes how this information is structured, and can	be 	useful	 across multiple domains,	including	digital	forensics,	incident	response,	and	counterterrorism. 
CASE overview A	 fundamental aspect of cyber-investigations is	the	 extraction	and	analysis of	traces,	where 	the 	definition	of a	 trace is any observable modification, including an absence ofexpected data, caused by an event in a digital crime scene (Casey, 2013).	 In	the	context	of	 cyber-investigations,	traces	are	used	to	 address 	questions,	which 	are 	generally	 described	 what,	 where,	 when,	 who,	 how and	 why.	 The	state	of	a 	trace	 is also importantto capture, such as whether it an item	 is allocated or deleted, or even whether anexpected	 trace exists	or	does	not 	exist.	 The	CASE specification language is	flexible	enough	to	 represent a	wide 	range of	traces (corresponding	to	cyber-items as defined in the UCO) and 	their 	associated 	properties,	including disks, devices, and file systems, providing a solid foundation for representing	details	 within	 cyber-investigations.	 Figure	 2 depicts	 a File	 object with multiple property	bundles. The	use	of	Property	Bundles	 in CASE was inspired by the “duck” model 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 		 	 	 			
		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 		 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 			
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	
implemented in the Hansken system	 (van Baar, van Beek, van Eijk, 2014). Properties can	include	date-time stamps, the 	contents of	 a	trace,	and 	the 	hash 	values 	(e.g.,	MD5 and SHA256) of the data. 
Figure 2: Duck model allows flexible representation of traces using various combinationof	property	bundles. Whereas DFAX utilized XML as its default serialization, in response to community input,CASE/UCO selected JSON-LD	 as	 the	 initial serialization binding (Lanthaler, Gütl, 2012).JSON is powerful and flexible but requires some scaffolding to support validation againstan	ontology.	 JSON-LD	 provides 	the	necessary structure to 	support full validation	 of	JSON	 content 	to	its	associated	ontological specification as 	shown	in	Figure 	3.	The explicitvalidation	 enabled	by	JSON-LD	 yields	assured	integrity	between	the	ontology	and	the	serialization, and offers significant automation advantages including built-in APIsupport for	 a range	 of	 languages	 (Python,	 Ruby,	PHP,	Go,	C#,	 Java,	etc.)	and	for lossless	 transformation between several serialization formats (JSON-LD, RDF-XML,	Turtle-RDF,	etc.). 
Figure 3:	 Example of CASE being used to represent a	file.	 The JSON in this example isJSON-LD, which	 uses	 strict,	 namespaced @type 	values to 	specify	the type 	for 	all	JSON 
© 2015 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.
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objects,	enabling	their	explicit 	traceability	back 	to	the	specifications	for	these	 types	 in	 the 	UCO. The	 ongoing	 community development of CASE is	working to expand	 the 	specification	 language in	order	 to 	cover 	other 	types of information such as Windows Registry entries,	 memory, and network traffic. 
Provenance For	 cyber-investigation purposes,	to	help	establish	the	authenticity	and 	reliability	ofinformation,	it	is important to capture where it originated	or	was	found,	as	well 	as	how it was 	handled 	after 	it	was 	found.	 This	lineage	is	collectively	referred	to	as	provenance. Provenance includes collection documentation, chain	of	custody	details, audit logs from	forensic	 acquisition	 tools,	 and	 integrity	 records,	 which 	all	 help	 to establish	the	 trustworthiness 	of cyber-investigation	 information.	 Provenance	 also involves tracking	the data source and extraction method for	 each trace,	such	as	 a	digital	photographobtained from	 a smartphone as 	shown	in	Figure 	4. 
Figure 4:	 Provenance of a digital photograph extracted from	 an Android device. CASE and UCO provide structures	 to	 represent all aspects 	of provenance	in	 cyber-investigations,	including	chain-of-custody, case management, and forensic processing.CASE captures provenance information using Provenance	Records	 which can include	environmental characteristics such as the details of a crime scene or where the evidence	 was 	physically 	located. In addition, CASE captures information about	any	Forensic	Action associated	with	each	 Provenance Record, as well as tracking who performed eachForensic Action and when it was performed (conceptual 	depiction in	Figure	5).	 A	 basicexample of a Forensic Action and Provenance Record is	provided	in	Figure	6. In	addition	to supporting provenance, Forensic Actions can give insight into which tools andmethods are effective in particular circumstances. 
			
	 	 	 	 								 							 							 							 	 	 							 	 							 					 												 							 	 							 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 							 									 							 							 									 							 					 					 							 							 	 							 	 							 	 							 	 							 	
Figure 5:	 Conceptual depiction of	 representing provenance 
{"@id":	"provenance_record1","@type":	"ProvenanceRecord","description": "Android Smartphone","exhibitNumber": "ACME-676553402357","object":	"device1"},{ "@id":	"annotation1","@type": "Annotation","description": "Make forensic image of Android device »,"tags":	["forensic" ],"object":	["forensic_action23" ]},{"@id":	"forensic_action23","@type": "ForensicAction","name": "imaged","startTime": "2017-01-15T17:59:43.25Z","endTime": "2017-01-15T19:59:43.25Z","propertyBundle":	[ 
								 											 	 											 											 	 											 													 											 											 													 											 											 											 	 									 									 											 	 											 											 	 									 							 					 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 		
{"@type": "ActionReferences","performer":	"investigator1","instrument": "tool1","object":	["device1" ],"result":	["provenance_record1"],"location":	"forensic_lab1","environment": "forensic_lab_computer1"},{"@type": "acme:ToolArguments","aquisitionType":	"Logical","method": "ADB" }]}, 
Figure 6:	 Example of forensic action and provenance representing using CASE. 
Complete technical representation of the physical location where evidence was obtainedand the people associated with the evidence can be covered by existing schemas.Therefore,	rather	than	recreating	a new 	representation	of	such information, it may bemore effective to leverage an existing schema for such data. CASE and UCO have	been	designed to accommodate such re-use. Rather than	include their own	geolocation	schema, they define	 an	 extension	 point where an existing schema can	be	used.	 
Fully-structured data	in CASE In addition to representing individual traces, it is important to capture their context andrelationship with	 other	 traces and 	entities,	 for	 provenance	 and	 investigative	 purposes.CASE represents the linkages between items using a combination of embeddedreferences	 for	 indelible	 properties	 and	 relationships	 for	 things	 that can change. 
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Figure 7:	 Structured representation of an Outlook PST file that contains an emailmessage with multiple attachements Being	able 	to represent structure	 by	 defining	 relationships 	within	the 	data	enables search and analysis methods at a higher level of abstraction, including graph query andpattern matching.	For	instance,	defined	relationships between items as shown in Figure	7 could be utilized to perform	 a graph	 search	 for	 all e-mail messages	 with	 a picture	attachment from	 the subject to the victim (Casey, Back, Barnum, 2015).	   
Representing	 Actions in 	CASE CASE and UCO provide a simple and adaptable way to represent an action or multiplerelated actions, which can be useful for sharing knowledge and supporting moreadvanced 	forensic	analysis.	 In	the	context	of 	cyber-investigations,	 CASE can	representactions involving digital traces such	 as	 a USB device	 being	 inserted	 into	 a computer andits	associated	traces	(Casey, Back, Barnum, 2015).	 CASE can also be used to representoffender and victim	 actions and 	the 	associated traces.	This	type	of	abstraction	can	provide	higher-level, human understandable portrayals of activities for more	efficientforensic	 analysis.	 Some forensic tools are adding features to support such	 abstractions for	 generalized	activities of interest that comprise various low-level	artifacts.	For 	instance,	the 	tagging	feature in Plaso (https://code.google.com/p/plaso/)	can	 group	 certain	combinations 	of digital artifacts into event categories such as Application Execution, Document Opened,and 	File 	Downloaded 	that	can	be 	queried to 	return	the 	underlying	low-level	digital	 artifacts 	associated 	with 	these 	events. CASE provides 	a	standardized 	way	to	represent	these kinds of actions. Furthermore, beyond simply categorizing low-level	artifacts,	CASE can	be	used	to	define	relationships	between	actions and 	traces,	thus	enabling	 more structured searches and refined analysis.	 
Action	lifecycleThe Action Lifecycle from	 UCO can	be	adapted	 within CASE to 	define 	phases 	of 	a	forensic investigation (e.g., documentation, preservation, examination,	analysis,	presentation) as 
			
		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 		
shown	 in	 Table	 1.	 This	generalized	approach	can	be	used	 to	 classify	 each	 action	 in	 a case,	which 	provides 	context	to 	support	further 	analysis.	 
Table	1: Forensic processes with different phases can be represented as an ActionLifecycle to categorize actions using CASE. The SADFC phases in ORD2i (i.e.,	 Extraction,	Settlement, Enhancement, Analysis) can berepresented in CASE as an Action Lifecycle. This type of information can	be	used	to	address various questions such as how much time was taken by each phase of aninvestigation, determining which tools are most useful for a given phase, and isolatingwhich 	results 	were 	generated 	at	different	phases. As shown in Table 2, the Action Lifecycle can also be used to categorize criminalactivities such as a sexual predator's grooming of victims or a network intruder's	method of operation (e.g., kill chain phases). 
		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 				
	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 			 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 			 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	
Table	2:	 The Action Lifecycle construct can be used to represent types of offenderactivities. 
Guiding	 PrinciplesThis	initiative	to	structure	and	share	 cyber-investigation information strives to adhereto an implement a core set of guiding principles that community consensus has deemednecessary. Using lessons learned from	 DFAX, CybOX, and STIX,	these	principles	are	as	follows: ExpressivityIn	order 	to	fully	support	the	diversity of use cases in digital forensics, this initiative aims to 	address 	all	defined 	use 	cases 	rather 	than	focusing	on	a	specific 	one.	This 	goal	involvescovering all types of information relevant to digital forensics for various purposes. Integrate	rather	than	duplicateBuild 	on	existing	standardized 	representations,	rather 	than	create 	a	separate 	one,	to avoid 	redundancy	and 	duplication	of 	effort. FlexibilityAvoid mandatory features to allow users to employ any portions of the standardizedrepresentation	that 	are	relevant for	a 	given	context. ExtensibilitySupport community driven refinement and evolution of the language by building inextension mechanisms for domain specific use, for localized use, for user-driven	refinements and evolution, and for ease of centralized refinement and evolution. AutomatabilityIntentionally seek to maximize structure and consistency to support machineprocessable automation. 
	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 			
	 		 	 	 	 	 	 		 		 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 				 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	
	
		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 		
ReadabilityCreate content structures to not only be machine-consumable and processable but	alsoto, as much as possible, be human-readable. This human readability is necessary forclarity and comprehensibility during the early stages of development and adoption, andfor sustained use in diverse environments going forward. 
Conclusions	 and Next	StepsThe CASE specification language and UCO support standardization	 and	 interoperability	of tools,	organizations,	and 	countries dealing	 with	 cyber-investigations.	 In	addition	to	sharing	 cyber-investigation information on a specific case, sharing	 traces	or	patterns	of	particular activities in a standardized format can help others find similar traces andpatterns 	in	new	cases.	Standardized 	representation	of 	traces 	can	also	be	useful	for application	 footprinting by 	recording	all	traces 	of 	a	given	action	(e.g.,	install,	execute,	uninstall). Sharing this kind of footprint information is a powerful means of facilitatingdigital forensic analysis and tool development. Codifying and sharing information in a standardized manner enables digitalinvestigators to search for similar patterns in their cases. Finding similar patternsbetween	cases 	can	support	reuse 	of 	previously 	effective 	solutions,	such as 	forensic analysis methods for proving that wiping occurred and possibly recovering remnants ofoverwritten	files,	thus	reducing	duplication	of	effort 	and	increasing	consistency	of	forensic analysis (Casey, 2013). Furthermore, searching for specific patterns acrosscases can potentially reveal links between related crimes (Garfinkel,	2012b). Community development is ongoing to expand the types of information that CASE canrepresent. In addition, an API/library is under development to enable tools to “speak”CASE. 
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